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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SECRET WITHDRAWALS OF CoRPORATE 
RECEIPTS BY STOCKHOLDER AS INCOME IN ABSENCE OF SURPLUS-As sole stock-
holder of the Robbins Tire and Rubber Company, the defendant managed 
and controlle'd the affairs of the corporation. Over a period of years he 
intercepted th~ company's receipts from several of its large customers and 
diverted them to his own use. No entries of such receipts were made on 
the books of the company, nor was any tax paid on them. Defendant was 
convicted for attempted evasion of his personal income tax on these funds.1 
On appeal, ·he_ld, affirmed. Taxation is concerned with actual command 
over property: If does not matter fvhether defendant got the funds as a 
iegal distribution of corporate property or took them fraudulently, since 
he assumed command and dominion over the cash and received economic 
gain therefrom. Davis v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 331, 
c;ert. de:n, .. 350 U.S. 965 (1956). ' 
The crucial question involved is whether these withdrawals constituted 
income to the defendant. A taxpayer receives income when he obtains 
control over property to the extent that he derives readily realizable economic 
1 The government proved only that defendant had taken from the gross receipts 
of the corporation. The taxpayer argued that it had failed to prove that any tax 
liability arose from these transactions, since there was no showing that the CO,!llpany had 
any surplus in the years in question from which dividends could be paid. 
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value from it "even though it may have been obtained by fraud and his 
freedom to use it may be assailable by someone with a better title to it."2 
This rule would seem to apply to the funds received by the defendant in 
the principal case. The theory of the government, which the court adopts, 
was that the funds are fraudulent, unrecorded diversions from the corpo-
ration which ar.e taxable as income under United States v. Rutkin.3 Com-
missioner v. Wilcox,4 which held that an embezzler's gain was not taxable 
income, is distinguished on the ground that defendant could not embezzle 
the funds of his wholly-owned corporation but merely took from himself 
under a different name.5 Under this view, the determination that the 
case is controlled by the Rutkin decision rather than. Commissioner v. 
Wilcox seems proper.6 When a sole stockholder of a corporation takes the 
funds of the corporation secretly, pursuant to a- plan of "covering his 
tracks" and avoiding any record of the transaction, the funds have the 
character of income as prescribed in the Rutkin case. The defendant in 
the principal case relied on specific provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code to the effect that corporate distributions, other than dividends, are 
not taxable income but serve to reduce the basis of the taxpayer's stock.7 
He claimed that his actions constituted distributions by the company,8 
and there is some support for this position.9 Congress has clearly divided 
2 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952), holding that funds received by 
extortion were taxable as income. See also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Burnet 
v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). 
s Note 2 supra. 
4 327 U.S. 404 (1946). The court held that the test of taxable income is twofold: 
(l) a claim of right to the funds, and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obliga-
tion to repay. 
5 Ka1:1-n v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1953) 210 F. (2d) 247, cert. den. 347 U.S. 967 
(1954), held that receipts taken by a president of a corporation for his personal use 
were income. The Wilcox case was distinguished on the fact that the taxpayer was a 
large stockholder and not merely an employee. The court felt that the possibility that 
a sole owner could embezzle the funds of bis own corporation under local law should 
not determine tax liability. 
6 The Wilcox case was severely limited by the Rutkin case, note 2 supra, which 
expressly limited it to its facts (embezzlement). Subsequent cases have left considerable 
doubt as to the exact status of the ·wncox decision. See Kann v. Commissioner, note 5 
supra. The same view was taken in United Mercantile Agencies Inc. v. Commissioner, 
23 T.C. 1105 (1955). See also Briggs v. United States, (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 699, 
<;ert. den. 348, U.S. 864 (1954); l\farienfield v. United States, (8th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 
632, cert. den. 348 U.S. 865 (1954); Berra v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 
590. In United States v. Bruswitz, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 59, cert. den. 349 U.S. 
913 (1955), the court stated that the possession and control criterion was diametrically 
opposed to the "claim of right" doctrine and that it was difficult to see what, if any-
thing, remained of the Wilcox decision. Yet, the same court in Dix v. Commissioner, 
(2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 436, cert. den. 350 U.S. 894 (1955), followed the Wilcox case 
where the president of a family corporation embezzled its funds. See Gelfand, "Wilcox 
or Rutkin-Is the Fog Lifting?" 34 TAXES 109 (1956). 
1 I.R.C., §§316 (a), 301 (c); I.R.C. (1939), §115 (d). 
s A formal declaration of dividends is not necessary to constitute corporate distribu-
tions. Christopher v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 527; Wiese v. Commissioner, 
(8th Cir. 1938) 93 F. (2d) 921, cert. den. 304 U.S. 562 (1937). See note 6 supra. 
9 Although the question has not been clearly raised heretofore, in Currier v. United 
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corporate distributions into two categories-dividends and non-dividends. 
The former are taxable as income while the latter are not taxed except 
when they have exceeded the cost basis of the stock, at which time they 
are taxed as gain from the sale of property.10 In order to create a tax 
liability, the distribution must have resulted in a dividend or a return of 
capital in excess of cost basis.11 The position of the court appears to be 
that section 301 properly applies only to conventional corporate distribu-
tions.12 Where money is taken pursuant to a scheme of total concealment, 
it does not result in a distribution of the character referred to by section 
301 but results in income by ·wrongful diversion of corporation funds. 
The question, then, is one of degree_ This rule can be rather easily applied 
to the extreme facts of the principal case, but future decisions must spell 
out at what point the secret character of the transaction removes it from 
the operation of section 301. The operation of such a rule should not be 
exte~ded beyond the type of covert withdrawal involved in the principal 
case. 
Kenneth H. Haynie, S-Ed. 
States, (1st Cir. 1948) 1~6 F. (2d) 346, the owner of 75% of the stock in a corporation 
(his wife owned the remainder) took receipts of the company. Part of the money was 
held taxable as a constructive dividend, the court holding that any further amounts 
were a return of capital or money wrongfully taken_ See also United States v_ Augustine, 
(3d Cir_ 1950) 185 F. (2d) 407, revd_ (3d Cir- 1951) 189 F. (2d) 587. 
101.R.C., §301; I.R.C. (1939), §115 (d). 
11 It is worthy of note that the holding of the Rutkin case, note 2 supra, was issued 
in a different context. Since the test there adopted applies equally well to dividends 
or capital returns, its utility in this area may be questioned. 
. 12 The Shield Company v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 763 (1943); George M. Gross v. 
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 756 (1955); Estate of Esther M. Stein, 25 T.C. No. 109 (1956). 
See also Estate of Ida S. Godley v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1082 (1953), revd. (3d Cir. 
1954) 213 F. (2d) 529, 
